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MORAL RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF RESEARCH FUNDING 
 
Some recent Australian developments in contract research funding have implications that 
are at least as significant as those associated with journal rankings. This article argues 
that heterodox economists should pay careful attention to the provisions that attach to 
research funding. This article examines links between Australia’s competitive and 
contract research funding arrangements, moral rights clauses and some implications for 
particular disciplines and areas of research, including heterodox economics. The aim of 
this article is to demonstrate the importance of being vigilant in the implications of all 
indicators of research output, quality and impact that are used in research assessment 
exercises. 
 3




Heterodox economists have expressed considerable concern about the practice of ranking 
journals as part of government and administration attempts to measure research quality. 
The purpose of this article is draw attention to another significant component of 
measurable research output in Australia: competitive and contract research funding. 
Within the context of Australia’s higher education research sector, research funding plays 
an important role in league tables which ostensibly rank the status of research institutions 
and in the promotional prospects of academics. It is also an area that has been heavily 
influenced by government policies. 
 
The aim of this article is to demonstrate the importance of being vigilant in the 
implications of all indicators of research output, quality and impact that are used in 
research assessment exercises. Some recent Australian developments in contract research 
funding have implications that are at least as significant as those associated with journal 
rankings. The following is an argument for careful attention to the provisions that attach 
to research funding and consists of three parts. Firstly it provides an overview of the role 
of competitive and contract research funding and its significance in the context of 
Australia’s higher education sector. Secondly, it discusses the relatively recent inclusion 
of moral rights clauses in research funding contracts and their implications for academic 
independence. The third section consists of a discussion of the links between Australia’s 
competitive and contract funding arrangements, moral rights clauses and some 
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implications for particular disciplines and areas of research, including heterodox 
economics.  
 
The Importance of Contract Research Funding in Australia 
Australian universities typically have few internal resources such as endowment funds for 
funding research programs and therefore rely on a dual funding approach comprised of 
block funding and competitive funding schemes administered by the Commonwealth 
Government. Block funding is provided through a number of schemes such as the 
Research Training Scheme, Institutional Grants Scheme, Research Infrastructure Block 
Grants Scheme and Australian Postgraduate Awards scheme. Allocations to each 
university are determined on the basis of performance measures and an associated 
funding formula administered by Australia’s relevant Commonwealth government 
department. Once block funding has been allocated, the recipient university can apportion 
the funds according to its research, teaching and other priorities.  
 
A second stream of funding is provided via a competitive funding mechanism. The 
largest and most prestigious sources of competitive funding are the Australian Research 
Council (ARC) and the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC). The 
ARC is the relevant body for most social research projects that concern heterodox 
economists, performing a similar role to the Economic and Social Research Council in 
the United Kingdom and the National Science Foundation in the United States. 
Researchers submit their project proposals to the ARC for peer assessment and, within 
the constraints of various guidelines and national research priorities, funding is allocated 
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to the most highly ranked projects. The two largest ARC funding schemes are Discovery 
Grants and Linkage Grants. A key difference between the two schemes is that Linkage 
Grant proposals require support and partial funding from “industry partners” from the 
private, public or not for profit sectors; Discovery Grant proposals do not require the 
participation of an industry partner.    Funding under these schemes is highly sought after 
and is considered a key indicator of research success and status in the higher education 
sector. The overall success rates for funding commencing in early 2008 were 21.4 per 
cent for Discovery Grants and 47.6 per cent for Linkage Grant applicants. In many cases 
the allocated funding was below the level requested by the project applications. For 
example, successful Discovery Grant applicants received an average of 65.4 per cent of 
their requested funding for 2008; for Linkage Grant applications the average was 
approximately 80 per cent (Australian Research Council: 2007a, b). 
 
The results of ARC competitive grant processes are widely publicized and published in 
tables showing the success rates and levels of funding for each university. The level of 
research funding obtained under these schemes contributes to each institution’s research 
income indicator for the next round of block funding. There is thus a dual pay off – the 
project funding and the flow on effect of improved block funding. 
 
A number of smaller categories of research funding sit alongside the major categories 
described above. Among these are research projects commissioned by federal and state 
government departments, statutory authorities, private firms and not-for-profit 
organizations. These projects are usually initiated by a call for tender that asks 
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researchers to submit project proposals that address predefined research objectives. While 
public sector expenditure on “contract research” projects represents a relatively small 
proportion of governments’ total research expenditure they are important within the 
context of university research funding and a particularly significant source of research 
funding among those working in the humanities and social sciences. Aggregated statistics 
for the higher education sector show that 2005 revenue from ARC grants totaled $A455 
million compared with revenue from contracts and consultancies of $A651 million 
(Department of Education Science and Training 2006: Table 1, p. 16). While 
consultancies might be considered different from research contracts, disaggregated 
information for the two categories of funding is not provided in this report. 
 
While contract research is important at an institutional level, it could be argued that its 
role is even more significant for the individual researchers who achieve such funding. 
Key indicators for assessing research performance and prospects for promotion generally 
involve success in the four areas of:  post-graduate completions; publication (increasingly 
in highly ranked journals); ‘high esteem’ factors (such as editorial board memberships, 
key note speaker invitations); and research income. In addition, many research units 
within universities employ research assistants and fellows who rely on the income from 
contract research for their continued employment.  
 
The purpose of this discussion is to provide an indication of the significance of contract 
research funding rather than a comprehensive account of its quantity and distribution. 
Indeed, despite its significance in the humanities and social sciences, there is little 
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detailed systematic information on the importance of contract research and the number of 
university researchers reliant on this form of funding (CHASS, 2006; Productivity 
Commission, 2007). The focus is the examination of a particular clause, commonly 
known as a moral rights waiver that is becoming increasingly prevalent in contracts for 
research undertaken for government departments. 
 
Moral rights and research contracts 
While the importance of contract research has continued to grow, the political and legal 
context in which it takes place has been subject to a range of developments. A significant 
change in recent years has been the inclusion of a clause known as a “moral rights 
clause” in the terms and conditions of contracts for research services undertaken for some 
government departments. The clauses require researchers to consent to the potential 
infringement of their moral rights. For many researchers this raises two questions: what 
does the term “moral rights” mean in this context; and what does it mean to consent to 
their possible infringement? 
 
In the Australian context, moral rights refer to a provision of the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) which allows individual creators to retain certain rights in relation to copyright 
works they may have sold to another party. The development of moral rights provisions 
was closely linked with international conventions recognizing the rights of those 
producing literary, dramatic, musical and other artistic works. In the context of a 
discussion on research contracts, however, the term author is perhaps more appropriate 
than creator. The moral rights retained by creators mean that they have the right: 
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• To be attributed (or credited) for their work; 
• Not to have their work falsely attributed; and 
• Not to have their work treated in a derogatory way. 
(From: www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/infosheets_pdf/G043.pdf) 
 
Moral rights are inalienable and individual. They are separate from the economic rights 
of copyright owners. While an individual creator retains specific moral rights, copyright 
owners have the economic rights relevant to the reproduction and distribution of the 
relevant work. The Copyright Act 1968 also allows for infringements of an author’s 
moral rights when it is reasonable for this to occur. 
 
The introduction of moral rights provisions through the Copyright Act 1968 has been an 
area of ongoing debate. While some copyright owners wish for unimpeded use of 
material they have acquired, artistic communities in particular have sought to protect the 
integrity of their work and their right of attribution. In an attempt to reconcile these 
competing approaches, the legislation includes a provision for individuals to consent to 
the infringement of their moral rights. In a parliamentary debate in 2000, the 
Commonwealth Attorney General outlined the argument in the following terms: 
 
The consent provision allows authors to decide for themselves what acts 
or omissions they will permit and whether or not it is in their interests to 
do so. It would be patronising to suggest that authors cannot decide this 
for themselves. The government believes that users of works are entitled 
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to certainty as to the legal effect of consent by an author to acts that 
would infringe moral rights. (Hansard, 2000) 
 
In recent years the debate appears to have shifted from arguments confined to the creative 
arts to issues associated with broader issues of authorship. The implications of moral 
rights for government departments who use materials authored by employees or provided 
by third parties were specifically considered by the Copyright Law Review Committee in 
2005 (Copyright Law Review Committee 2005). The Committee noted that there was 
significant support for the legislative provision on moral rights and that it allowed for 
exceptions based on a standard of reasonableness.  
 
The Commonwealth Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), however, 
argued that the test of reasonableness was insufficient to ensure that they were not 
hindered in their use of material over which they held copyright: 
 
For example, FACS has been approached by an author who sought to prevent 
FACS modifying material that the author had created for and delivered to FACS 
(copyright was owned by FACS). As it was necessary for FACS to modify the 
material and disseminate [it] to the public, FACS was forced to rely on a 
presumption that its activities were ‘reasonable’. (Copyright Law Review 
Committee 2005: 148) 
 
Two government departments from Western Australia submitted similar views: 
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The WA Attorney-General stated that governments should, as far as 
possible, comply with moral rights, but considered that government should not 
be bound by Part IX. His submission expressed concern that identifying and 
attributing authors in some circumstances is ‘difficult and possibly 
unreasonable.’ The WA Department of Premier and Cabinet expressed a 
similar view. (Copyright Law Review Committee 2005:149) 
 
The Committee concluded however that “there should be no change to the current moral 
rights provisions insofar as they relate to government” and argued that their view 
“accords with most of those in submissions” (Copyright Law Review Committee 
2005:151). In short, the existing legislative provisions were considered to provide 
sufficient flexibility for government departments to use their copyright materials in a 
reasonable manner. 
 
Since the Committee’s conclusions were reached, some government departments and 
organizations reliant on public funding have proceeded to insert consents to 
infringements of moral rights into various contracts for services. The following clause, 
contained in a research contract recently sent to a colleague, is an example of a moral 
rights consent: 
 
The contractor will obtain from its personnel and any sub-contractors, to the 
extent permitted by applicable law, unconditional: 
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(a) Consents to any alteration to, including additions to, or deletions from, any 
Contract Material used or produced in connection with the Agreed Services that 
would otherwise infringe their moral rights… 
 
In effect, this means that a University, as “contractor”, must obtain consents from their 
staff agreeing to the potential infringement of their moral rights in connection with the 
project undertaken. 
 
No centrally coordinated information has been found from which to cite the prevalence of 
such provisions in research contracts, nor has detailed information been found on where 
they originated and how they became more commonplace. It seems likely that moral 
rights clauses were progressively added to research contracts by individual 
Commonwealth and State government departments in response to the Copyright Law 
Review Committee’s decision not to recommend blanket changes, as discussed above.  
Regardless of their origin or rationale, eighteen such contracts were signed at Curtin 
University of Technology in the two years preceding the 2007 federal election. 
Australia’s higher education sector includes 37 publicly funded universities and one 
small privately funded university which could reasonably be expected to have significant 
interest in such sources of research income. 
 
Can Independent Research that is Politically Sensitive Exist Alongside Moral Rights 
Waivers? 
 12
Consenting to an infringement of moral rights in order to obtain a research contract has 
obvious implications for academic freedom and integrity. It effectively means that the 
resulting research reports/outcomes can be altered by the contracting government 
department. Some government departments have refused to negotiate on this issue and 
have adopted a take it or leave it approach to ‘negotiating’ contracts relevant to research 
projects and funding. 
 
A researcher’s decision to refuse to sign a moral rights consent may have relatively 
serious implications. As discussed above, one of the key indicators of academic activity 
in the Australian system is the securing of research income. It confers status on the lead 
researchers and, along with publications, is a key factor determining promotion prospects. 
Refusing to sign research contracts containing a moral rights consent and forgoing 
research income therefore has potentially significant personal consequences for lead 
researchers on contract projects.  
 
More importantly, however, some academics and research units employ staff whose 
salaries are funded almost entirely on the basis of securing such contracts. The continued 
viability of such units depends on their success in securing research grants and contracts. 
If a principal researcher refuses to sign a contract on the basis of a moral rights waiver, it 
may well be the staff working for him/her on a particular project who are vulnerable to 
reduced prospects for continued employment. Again, this has resulted in pressure on 
academics to sign contracts. It is unclear whether this situation might constitute duress; a 
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context in which a researcher is not freely able to make a decision about whether to sign a 
contract.  
 
The combination of moral rights clauses within the context of research assessment 
exercises and promotion systems that give high priority to the achievement of research 
funding goes to the heart of academic independence. This, of course, is an issue for all 
academics. However, it seems particularly relevant for heterodox economists who, by 
definition, are likely to have research interests outside of mainstream economic theory 
and policy approaches.  
 
An example of the potential for colliding interests was very publicly demonstrated during 
the Australian federal election in 2007. In 2005, the conservative Liberal/National Party 
coalition government had introduced wide ranging legislative changes, generally known 
as WorkChoices, to the regulatory framework governing employment relations. Analysis 
of Work Choices did not lie within the scope of one discipline. Key implications were 
relevant to a range of researchers with overlapping interests in economic and social 
research. As a result, the regulations were keenly debated by researchers in the areas of 
industrial relations, employment law and labour market economics. Heterodox 
economists were among the contributors from a range of relevant disciplines (see for 
example Jefferson and Preston 2007; Jefferson et al, 2007; King and Stilwell, 2006; King 
2005; Plowman and Preston, 2005). 
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In the period immediately preceding the 2007 election, academics who discussed research 
findings that showed sectoral declines in earnings and employment conditions under the 
new regulatory framework were subject to very public and unfavourable comment from 
the Workplace Relations Minister, Joe Hockey. In some cases, comments were not 
focused on the validity of research findings but on researchers themselves (O'Keefe, 
2007). Researchers’ backgrounds appeared to be scrutinized for evidence of previous 
work experience or interest in issues relevant to the opposition Australian Labor Party or 
trade unions and their capacity to produce competent research was questioned. Perhaps 
the most prominent example of such treatment was that meted out to Professor John 
Buchanan from the University of Sydney, following the release of research whose 
findings could be construed as politically damaging to the Liberal/National Party 
coalition government (Van Wanrooy et al, 2007). Minister Hockey’s derogatory 
comments made front page news in Australia’s only national daily newspaper and there 
was discussion about whether Buchanan would take legal action against the Minister 
(ABC News 2007). The fact that the project also involved researchers without prior 
involvement in labour movement organizations was, along with the content of the report, 
relatively neglected.  
 
One of the key issues throughout the various WorkChoices debates was the need for 
research that could monitor the effects of the legislation on different sectors of the 
workforce. There were significant limitations on the capacity of existing official data 
sources to monitor change in key areas of wage and employment conditions. For 
example, it was not possible to know whether increases in average earnings represented 
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an improvement in employment conditions or the implications of the trading-off of an 
employment entitlement such as annual leave or overtime. This was a shortcoming noted 
by the Minister himself and emphasized in a number of reports undertaken in the two 
years prior to the election (Preston, Jefferson, and Seymour 2006; ABC Online 2007). In 
the absence of adequate official data, a wide range of relatively small scale research 
projects were undertaken with funding from diverse sources including State government 
departments and not for profit organizations (see for example a series of six coordinated 
studies is summarised in Elton et al, 2007).  
 
In the aftermath of the election, which was won by the Australian Labor Party, the ex-
Minister admitted that some of his cabinet colleagues had probably been unaware that 
existing employment conditions could in fact be compromised under the WorkChoices 
legislation. Without the heat of an election context, the implications of the legislation for 
workforce participants were discussed in a relatively more considered manner. It became 
apparent that misgivings about the legislation were not confined to academics with labour 
movement connections but extended to members of the previous government who, prior 
to the election, had publicly supported the introduction of the legislation (Jackson, 2008). 
 
In the context of wide reaching legislation which aimed to encourage flexibility, 
employment growth and family friendly working provisions, it would not have been 
unreasonable for a number of relevant government departments to call for research 
projects that addressed specific issues of concern. In this particular case there were few 
relevant calls for research proposals. However, the possible inclusion of a moral rights 
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clause in research contracts would have been a cause for concern among the research 
community in this context. WorkChoices was a highly politicized and contentious piece 
of legislation. While there was (and continues to be) a need for independent, constructive 
research, it appears likely that many researchers with relevant experience would be 
unwilling to sign a research contract that contained a clause such as that outline above 
(see for example the discussion in O'Keefe, 2007). 
 
The growing inclusion of moral rights clauses in research contracts therefore has a 
number of implications. Firstly, there are issues of self selection; researchers who are 
most likely to produce results that do not reflect government policy may also be those 
who are unlikely to allocate time and resources to tendering for research proposals. 
Clearly, researchers who do not tender for government research contracts have reduced 
scope for achieving external research income. Secondly, if academics do tender for 
contract research projects, they may be required to sign a moral rights waiver as part of 
the conditions of project funding. As argued above, consents have implications for 
academic independence and the representation of the research findings. Thirdly, without 
external research income, academics have a reduced capacity to employ research 
assistants and prospects for this source of research training and experience become more 
limited. Finally, the question of achieving research contracts is linked with the 
promotional prospects of individual academics. 
 
It is a matter for conjecture as to whether heterodox economists are likely to be over 
represented among researchers who are affected by moral rights waivers. However, 
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heterodox economists are, by definition, those who have taken a methodological position 
outside of the mainstream. It appears likely that this sector of the profession will have 
sensitivities about the prospects of research being misrepresented or misattributed. At a 
minimum, it could be expected that heterodox economists would be among those groups 




Currently, two factors may mitigate the ongoing effects of moral rights clauses and the 
pending introduction of a research assessment system. Firstly, there was a change of 
government in November 2007. The new (Australian Labor Party) government is using 
rhetoric which indicates that the use of moral rights waivers will be inconsistent with 
their wish for open debate. In particular, the Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science 
and Research, Kim Carr is in the early but active stages of discussion about a charter of 
researchers’ rights and responsibilities that appears directly relevant to the issues raised 
by moral rights clauses. Addressing Universities Australia in March 2008, the Minister 
stated: 
 
University academics have not felt entirely confident to speak out about their 
research, where this has had bearing on Government policy. Those that have 
spoken publicly have sometimes incurred the wrath of the Government itself. 
They have been held up to ridicule and their reputations have been questioned. 
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There have been many instances of this – I don’t need to cite them here. This 
made academics think twice before they spoke up. 
 
At the same time, the previous Government used its funding powers to exert 
influence over universities themselves…. 
 
This meant that they were sometimes less than able to fulfill their proper role as 
guardians and creators of knowledge – let alone their legitimate role as generators 
of debate, enablers of dissent and challengers to the status quo. (Carr, 2008) 
 
Secondly, the specific issue of moral rights has been taken up by the universities’ peak 
body, Universities Australia. Its Chief Executive Officer, Dr Glenn Withers, who has a 
background as an academic economist, has been charged with negotiating this issue with 
the Australian government on behalf of its thirty eight member universities.   
 
Research assessment exercises do not operate in a vacuum and the broader political and 
legislative climate can combine with research assessment exercises to have significant 
and perhaps unintended consequences. Heterodox economists, particularly in Australia,  
already face challenges with respect to the growing use of journal rankings and citation 
indexes to measure the ‘quality’ of their research. Australia’s recent experience suggests 
that research assessment exercises will warrant additional vigilance in any area of activity 
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